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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
PETE VICTOR MONTOYA,
Defendant/Appellee.

1
]
I
;

CASE NO. 20010458-SC
PRIORITY NO. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1999).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes, rules, and constitutional
provisions are relevant to this case, and their text is
set forth in Addendum A: Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1999).
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION OF
ARGUMENT
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err in denying Mr.
Montoya's motion for new trial based on new evidence?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's decision to deny
a motion for a new trial is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard and this Court "assume[s] that the

2
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trial court exercised proper discretion unless the record
clearly shows the contrary." State v. James, 819 P.2d
781, 793 (Utah 1991) .
PRESERVATION:

This

issue

was

raised

in

a motion

before the trial court. R. 275.
ISSUE NO. 2: Was Montoya denied effective assistance
of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In challenging a conviction on
the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is
defendant's burden to show (1) that his counsel rendered
a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and
(2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have
been different but for counsel's error. State v. Geary,
707

P.2d

645

(Utah

1985);

see

also

Strickland

v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674-, 104 S. Ct.
2052 (1984). This issue is properly raised for the first
time on appeal. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah
App.1991).
ISSUE NO. 3:

Was there insufficient evidence to

support Defendant's convictions for Criminal Homicide and
Attempted Criminal Homicide?
3
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: An appellate court will reverse
a conviction only when the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict,

"is

sufficiently

inconclusive

or

inherently

improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime
of which he was convicted." State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d
1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1990).
PRESERVATION: This issue was raised in a motion for
directed verdict. R. 386:42, 387:4.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pete Montoya was charged by information with one
count of Criminal Homicide, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1999), and two
counts of Attempted Criminal Homicide, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1999). On November 8-14, 2000,
Mr. Montoya was found guilty as charged after a jury
trial before the Honorable

Judge Timothy Hansen. On

January 12, 2001, a Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was
entered sentencing Montoya to a term of imprisonment of
4
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five years to life on Count I, and a term of imprisonment
of one-to-fifteen years each on Counts II and II, the
sentences to run consecutively, with a one-year firearm
enhancement on each count. On January 2, 2001, Montoya
filed a Motion for New Trial. On March 8, 2001, the trial
court issued a memorandum order denying Montoya's Motion
for a New Trial. On May 15, 2001, Montoya filed a Notice
of Appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the night of May 16, 1997, Kelly "Nick" Seal, Matt
Seal, and Greg Ulibarri had gone to watch drag races, and
were in a maroon Honda Civic belonging to Nick and Matt's
mother. R. 384 at 3-20. Kelly was driving the car. R. 384
at 26:21-23. Matt was sitting in the middle of the back
seat of the car, and Greg was sitting in the front
passenger seat. R. 384 at 1-3, R. 385 at 42:24-25, 43:17, 44:4-10, 57:13-17. At around midnight, the boys left
the place where the drag races were taking place, and
went to an "Amoco Rainbo Mart" gas station to use the
restroom and get a drink. R. 384 at 28:4-25, 29:11-12,
385 at 57:7-25. The boys ran into someone Greg knew,
5
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named Monty, at the gas station, and talked to him for
about five minutes.
Matt noticed
"squealing

it's

R. 384 at 29:23-25, 30:1-25.

a Red GMC truck at the gas pumps
tires." R.

384

at

31:1-13. It was

stipulated at trial that the driver of the truck was
Russell Thornwall. R. 385 at 82:7-16. The driver of the
truck get out of the vehicle and begin to pump gas.

R.

384 at 32:15-18. At that point, Matt went inside the
store. R. 384 at 75:4-10. Matt saw Pete Montoya inside
the store. R. 384 at 41:4-9, 75:15-25. Matt did not know
when Pete had entered the store, but simply ended up
standing behind him in line at the cash register. R. 384
at 75:11-25, 77:10-11. When Matt was in line with Pete
inside the store, Pete did not speak to him, and Matt and
Pete did not look at each other. R. 384 at 41:20-23. Pete
was simply paying for a purchase when Matt saw him. R.
384 at 41:18-19. Pete did not look at Matt, or call him
names, or make any aggressive gestures toward him.

R.

384 at 77:15-23.
Matt testified that after he came out of the store,
and he and the other boys were talking to Monty, he saw
6
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the driver of the red truck "throwing up his hands," and
yelling

"VLT." R. 384 at 33:22-25, 78 at 3-8. Matt

understood the hand gestures to be "threatening [them]",
and he understood "VLT" to be the abbreviation of a
gang.

R. 384 at 34:7-12. During this time, Matt did not

see Pete Montoya leave the store. R. 384 at 79:8-24. Matt
testified that the boys ignored the driver of the truck,
and left the gas station to head back to the races.

R.

384 at 35:13-24.
Matt testified that right after the boys left the gas
station, Kelly received a call on his pager and turned
around and went back to the gas station to use the
payphone there.

R. 384 at 36:1-12. Kelly got out of the

car and began to use the phone. R. 384 at 37:4-5. After
a minute Greg got out of the car and also went to the
payphone. R. 384 at 37:10-15.
sitting in the back seat.

Matt stayed in the car,

R. 384 at 36:20-21, 37:18-19.

Matt testified that the front passenger window was open,
but the back windows were closed.

R. 384 at 37:16-19.

Matt testified that the driver of the red truck was
"still

yelling"

at

the

time

Kelly

was

7
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using

the

payphones.

R. 384 at 37:23-25, 38:1-2. Greg testified

that this was the first time he noticed the red truck,
and looked over and saw an individual pumping gas. R. 385
at

62:8-9,

18-25.

When

Greg

looked

over

at

this

individual, he "threw up his hands and started yelling at
[Greg]."

R. 385 at 63:5-24. Matt testified that he could

no longer hear what the driver of the truck was saying,
because

of

the

distance.

R.

384

at

38:3-10.

Matt

testified that he just "glanced at [the driver] really
quick," and didn't see whether the driver was making any
gestures at that time. R. 384 at 38:11-14.
Kelly and Greg were at the payphones for about two
minutes.

R. 384 at 38:23-24.

Before Kelly and Greg got

back to their car, the red truck pulled up and stopped
behind their car, a couple of car lengths away. R. 384 at
39:1-17, 385 at 64:14-21.

Matt noticed that the truck

had pulled up behind them because it was "revving the
engine."

R. 384 at 83:23-25. Matt testified that the

truck's passenger door was open, and "you could see the
driver and the middle passenger." R. 384 at 39:18-25.
Matt testified that the middle passenger "looked like he
8
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was in back seat/'

R. 384 at 40:13-16, but that he

couldn't tell for certain whether the middle passenger
was in the back seat or the front seat.

R. 384 at 87:1-

9. At trial Matt admitted that he told a police officer,
in an interview shortly after the shooting, that "all
three men were in the front seat." R. 385 at 10:17-25,
11:18-25. When it was brought to Matt's attention at
trial that he had previously said that all three men were
in the front seat, he stated, "That's what it looked like
to me." R. 385 at 12:1-5.
the

truck,

but

heard

Greg couldn't tell who was in

two

something from the truck.

or

three

voices

yelling

R. 385 at 65:9-18.

As Matt looked back at the truck, he saw Pete Montoya
leave the gas station store, walk past the boys' car and
get into the front passenger seat of the red truck. R.
384 at 40:1-2, 42:22-25, 43:1-9. When Pete walked passed
the boys' car, he did not seem angry, and did not make
any threatening gestures or any remarks. R. 384 at 84:925, 85:1-9. Greg did not see Pete Montoya walk out form
the store or get into the truck.

R. 385 at 65:19-21.

9
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Kelly and Greg got back into the car, they were going
to leave the gas station.

R. 384 at 44:11-15, 385 at

66:7-10. The truck was parked behind their car, and Matt
heard the "revving" of the truck's engine. R. 384 at
44:5-7. As the boys began to head for the exit of the gas
station, the red truck started to follow them and then
swerved toward them, almost hitting their vehicle.
384

at

44:18-23. He

testified

that

the

truck

R.
was

momentarily side-by-side with their vehicle, directly in
front of the gas station doors. R. 384 at 44:24-25, 45:15.
Matt testified that the driver was yelling at them.
R. 384 at 46:4-8. Matt testified that the front passenger
was Pete Montoya. R. 384 at 45:13-15. He testified at
trial that he saw the front passenger "leaning over,
yelling also."

R. 384 at 11-12. He also testified at

trial that the front passenger was "leaning over the
driver," and "looking right at [their] car."

R. 384 at

57:1-10. He testified that he "heard two or three voices"
coming from the truck. R. 384 at 64:9-11.

However, at a

civil deposition taken eleven months after the shooting,
W
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Matt testified under oath that he didn't look at the
occupants of the truck when the truck almost hit them,
but that "we still seen they were behind us.
headlights were shining in our car."

Their

R. 385 at 13:5-7,

15:10-15, 17:11-25, 18:1-25. In fact, Matt testified at
the civil deposition that the last time he actually saw
the faces of the one of the occupants of the red truck
was when the boys were at the pay phone, and the red
truck was behind them and the driver was revving its
engine. R. 385 at 20:7-20.
Matt testified at trial that he heard the occupants
of the truck yelling "VLT" and calling them "pussies."
R. 384 at 45:16-18, 30:21-25, 31:1. However, at the civil
deposition, Matt testified that although he could hear
the occupants of the truck yelling, he could not hear
anything in particular that they were saying. R.
18:2-8.

Matt

testified

at

trial

that

the

385 at
"middle

passenger" was not doing or saying anything, as far as
Matt

could

see. R.

384

at

46:9-12.

In

fact, Matt

testified that he could not see the middle passenger at
that time. R. 384 at 64:12-14.
11
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Kelly and the boys then began to leave the gas
station by the west exit.
testified

R. 384 at 46:15-18.

that the red truck was following

Matt

directly

behind boys' vehicle, and headlights of the truck were
shining right onto the them. R. 384 at 52:21-25, 53:1-7.
Greg testified that the truck was directly "dead center"
and about 15 feet behind their car as they were exiting
the gas station.

R. 385 at 80:8-21.

As the boys were

coasting out of the exit, turning left, Matt heard two or
three

gunshots.

R.

384

at

54:9-16,

testified that he heard two loud bangs.
5 .

60:11-16.

Greg

R. 385 at 70:3-

•

Matt testified at trial that the truck was "behind
us, off to the right a little bit," when the shots were
fired. R. 384 at 59:17-24,

R. 384 at 59:17-25, 60:1-4.

He testified that the truck took off "at a high rate of
speed, revving the engine, turning right, squealing the
tires." R. 384 at 60:7-8.

He also testified that he

heard someone shout, "VLT rules," as the truck sped away.
R. 384 at 60:9-10, 65:1-8. Greg testified that after the
shots were fired, he heard "a motor going up and tired
12
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screaming, off to the right of [him]." R. 385 at 90:1-3.
After the shots were fired, the boys' car came to a
stop in the middle of the road, R. 385 at 55:6-18,
State's Exhibit 9.

The car's back window, on the left

and right side, and right pillar was hit by the gunshots.
R. 384 at 54:16-25, 55:1-5, 61:15-25, State's Exhibit 610. Matt did not see a gun.

R. 384 at 62:18-22. Matt's

brother Kelly Seal was shot once in the head, and died as
a

result

of

that

injury. R.

384 at

60:19-22. Greg

Ulibarri was hit by a bullet in the right side of his
back.

R. 384 at 63:13-19. Matt Seal was not hit by

gunfire or injured. R. 384 at 55:25, 56:1-3, 63:11-12.
Other Evidence in Support of Verdict
In addition to the facts set forth above, based on
the testimony of Greg Uliberri and Matt Seal, the State
presented

the

following

evidence

in

support

of the

verdict:
Alicia Peterson
Alicia Peterson testified that on the night of May 16
and early morning hours of May 17, 1997, she went to the
Amoco station with some friends, including a man named
13
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Monte. R. 385 at 109:12-24. While at the Amoco station,
Alicia saw a red Chevy truck pull into the gas station
and squeal its tires as it went from one side of the
pumps to the other side. R. 110:22-25, 111:1-16. Alicia
identified photographs of Russell Thornwall's truck as
the truck she saw that night. R. 385 at 114:6-25. State's
Exhibit's 3 and 4. Alicia saw someone pumping gas into
the truck.

R. 385 at 112:10-24. She also saw people get

out of the truck and go inside the store.
112:2-4,

128:17-20. She

saw

someone

R. 385 at

sitting

on

the

passenger side of the truck who was using a cell phone.
R.

385

at

113:19-25,

129:18-25.

She

described

the

individual who used the cell phone as having dark, short
hair. R. 385 at 113:24-25. She thought there was a third
person in the truck, but she could not recall what he
looked like.

R. 385 at 114:3-5.

Alicia and her friends left the gas station, but
returned a few minutes later, and saw the red Honda in
the middle of the street, and Greg Uliberri was leaving
the vehicle. Alicia had

some contact with Greg and

learned that he had been shot. She testified that Greg
14
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told her, "They were showing, giving us gang signs." R.
385 at 121:20-25, 122:1-3.
In 1999, Alicia identified Russell Thornwall and Pete
Montoya from a photo lineup as individuals who were
involved with the red truck that night. R. 385 at 122:425, 123:1-3. State's Exhibit 24. She rated her certainty
regarding Thornwall (in photo 24-B) as someone who was
involved with the red truck as an 8 on a scale of 1-10,
and of Pete Montoya (in photo 26-A) as a 5, on a scale of
1-10. R. 385 at 123:24-25, 124:1-3, 133:11-25, 134:5-19,
174:6-11. Although Alicia believed one of these two
individuals was pumping gas and one talking on a cell
phone, she was not certain which of the two was doing
what. R. 385 at 124:11-16, 126:12-15. Alicia also picked
a

photo

from

another

group

of

photos

as

another

individual, Ronnie Ontiveros, as being involved with the
red truck. R. 385 at 124:17-25, 125:1-19, 134:17-25,
135:1-6, 174: 12-13. State's Exhibit 25-B. She rated Mr.
Ontiveros an 8, on a scale of 1-10, as far as her
certainty. R. 385 at 134:16-25, 135:1-6, 174:12-13.

15
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Rob Nielson
Sheriff

Rob

Nielson

testified

had

an

encounter with Russell Thornwall on June 20, 2000.

R.

385 at 136:6-25, 137:1-2.

that

he

Nielson attempted to do a

felony stop on the vehicle that Thornwall was in, and
Thornwall exited the vehicle and ran on foot. R. 385 at
137:5-10. Thornwall fired several rounds at Nielson's
vehicle and at Nielson.

R. 385 at 137:12-15. Thornwall

used his right hand to fire the shots at Nielson. R. 385
at 137:18-20. Thornwall ran behind a building and shot
himself in right side of the head.

R. 385 at 138:4-10.

John Campbell
John Campbell was a police officer who was called to
the scene of the shooting at issue in this case.

R. 385

at 139:17-25, 140:1-25. Campbell observed and made a
diagram of the crime scene. R. 385 at 141:17-25. State's
Exhibit 27, Defendant's Exhibit 41. Although Campbell
made various measurements from a "reference point," the
reference

point's

significance.

location

has

R. 385 at 144:4-18.

no

particular

Campbell recovered

two bullet casings from the crime scene at the points
16
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marked 1 and 2 on his diagram.

R. 385 at 148:10-25,

149:1-3, State's Exhibits 29 and 30. The points at which
the bullet casings were found were marked by orange cones
in photographs taken at the scene.

R. 385 at 151:8-24,

State's Exhibit 34, 43. Campbell testified that there was
sufficient room for a car, exiting and heading south, to
drive between the casing and the curb. R. 385 at 160:2023.
Campbell also took photographs of the car's interior,
showing a bullet entry "wounds" on the passenger's side
of the car, the back of the front passenger's seat, and
the back seat of the car where the bullet passed through
before entering the passenger's seat.
25,

R. 385 at 152:17-

153:1-25, 154:1-6. State's Exhibits 35-39. Campbell

also took photographs of the outside of. the vehicle
showing the bullet entry "wound" into the right portion
of the vehicle, and the shattered back window. R. 385 at
154:15-25.

State's Exhibits 6, 9,10.

Officer Campbell

testified that he was unable to determine exactly how
many bullets pierced the car, but knew that at least two
had pierced the car, and perhaps up to four hit the car.
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R. 385 at 155:23-25, 385 at 163:6-17. Campbell testified
that the bullet that entered the right rear of the car
appeared to have traveled through the back seat, into the
front passenger's seat, and hit the front passenger.
385 at 156:1-12.

R.

The back window was broken by another

bullet. R. 385 at 13-16. Officer Campbell believed that
the bullet that broke the rear window was the one that
killed Kelly Seal.

R. 385 at 158:12-17.

Defendant's

Exhibit 40.
Richard Montanez
Richard Montanez, a detective with the Salt Lake
Metro Gang Unit, got involved in the investigation of the
instant case in February of 1999, after receiving leads
from

confidential

informants.

R.

385

at

166:1-29.

Through these leads, detective Montanez was able to
verify that the red truck from which the shots were fired
belonged to Russell Thornwall.

R. 385 at 166:15-25. It

was stipulated at trial that the truck did indeed belong
to

Russell

Thornwall-

Id.

Detective

Montanez

also

identified a picture of Pete Montoya, and a tattoo on
Pete Montoya's arm which said, "VLT."

R. 168:11-21,
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State's Exhibits 1, 2.

Detective Montanez testified

that Pete Montoya was right-handed, R. 385 at 169:6-21,
and it was stipulated at trial that Pete Montoya was
right-handed. R. 385 at 169:22-24.
Detective Montanez located and inspected the truck
that was used in the shooting.

R. 385 at 176:24-25,

177:1-25, 1781-4. He described and diagramed the truck's
interior, including the front bench seat and back bench
seat.

R.

385

at

179:4-9,

and

a

gear

shifter

of

approximately 2 feet in length in the center of the floor
in the front. R. 385 at 179:10-20.

State's Exhibit 44.

Detective Montanez testified that he is right-handed
and typically shoots with his right hand.
181:2-10.

R. 385 at

He testified that although he has shot a gun

with his left hand, it is "less accurate" being his
"weaker hand."

R. 385 at 181:10-16.

Matt Sotuyo
Matt was working as a store clerk at the Amoco
station the night of the shooting.

R. 386 at 32:18-25,

33:1-11, 34:13-25. Matt heard two gunshots and then saw
the red truck

speeding

out of the

station, heading
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southbound. R. 386 at 34:22-25, 35:1-8.

Matt could see

the passenger side of the truck as it sped out of the
parking lot.

R. 386:6-13.

Matt did not see anything

sticking out of the passenger window.
22.

R. 386 at 37:13-

Matt saw the passenger looking back, as if to see

what happened, and then turning back around.

R. 386 at

38:7-18.
Dr. Grey
Dr. Todd Grey is the Chief medical Examiner for the
State of Utah. R. 385 at 45:9-14.

Dr. Grey performed an

autopsy on Kelly Nicholas Seal on May 17, 1997.
at 46:8-11.

R. 385

Dr. Grey testified that Kelly died from a

gunshot wound to the back of the head. R. 385 at 47:1923, 48:14-15.

He also testified that the size of the

projectile which caused the gunshot wound was "anywhere
from . . . a .32 to a .30 caliber."

R. 385 at 47:6-12.

He also testified that the projectile entered the back of
the head a little to the right of the mid-line, and
lodged just above the left eye.
Grey

R. 385 at 47:16-23. Dr.

could not determine the distance from which the

shot was fired, but could say from the that it was fired
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from distance of over three feet.

R. 385 at 3-8. The

autopsy report, State's Exhibit 17, and some diagrams of
the

injuries, State's

Grey's testimony.

Exhibits

18-20,

supported

Dr.

Dr. Grey testified that he could not

determine the position of the shooter in relation to the
victim, and stated, "Whether the person was turning and
the shooter was to their side versus they were looking
straight ahead and the shooter behind them, I cannot tell
you."

R. 385 at 53:4-10, 53:21-25, 54:1-5. Dr, Grey

testified that it was his opinion that the bullet that
killed Kelly passed through glass, and not metal, before
it struck Kelly. R. 385 at 55:4-14.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion by denying Mr.
Montoya's Motion for New Trial where the proposed new
evidence, a witness who stated that he was the front seat
passenger in Russelll Thornwall's truck and saw Russell
Thornwall

fire

the

gun,

could

not

have

been

with

reasonable diligence discovered and produced at trial by
counsel, and would

clearly result in the probability of

a different outcome at trial.

In the alternative, if
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this Court finds that trial counsel could have discovered
and produced the new evidence with reasonable diligence,
then Montoya received ineffective assistance of counsel
when his

trial

diligence

to

witnesses.

counsel

failed

discover

and

to exercise

produce

reasonable

critical

defense

Finally, there was insufficient evidence to

support Montoya's convictions for Homicide and Attempted
Homicide where the evidence only established Montoya's
presence in the vehicle and his brief participation in a
verbal

altercation,

and

was

simply

inconclusive

with

regards to who actually fired the gun.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred When it Denied Montoya's
Motion for a New Trial.

Mr.

Montoya,

through

his

trial

counsel,

filed

a

motion for a new trial on January 22, 2001, approximately
one month after the trial in this matter, asserting that
critical

new

counsel.

R.

statements

evidence

had

276-280. This
of

two

become
evidence

witnesses:

One

known

to

consisted
witness
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defense
of

stated

the
to

defense investigators that he was the third passenger in
the red truck the night of the shooting, and that he was
the front seat passenger that night, not Pete Montoya,
and that he was using a cell phone during the time
Thornwall began yelling at the victims, and that Russell
Thornwall was the shooter. R. 281-283. This witness's
identity was not revealed in Montoya's Motion for New
Trial, apparently based on an agreement with Montoya's
trial counsel and defense investigators that the witness
would give a statement only if his identity was not
revealed.

R. 284-287. The second witness was Jason

Thornwall, Russell Thornwall's brother, who stated that
Russell talked to him about the instant case, and said:
"Pete Montoya is in jail for something I did."

R. 288-

289.
In State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994),
this Court noted that a "trial court has a wide range of
discretion

in

determining

whether

newly

discovered

evidence entitles a litigant to a new trial."

The

Goddard court added, "[i]f the trial court's decision is
within the limits of responsibility, we will uphold it."
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Id. (citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah
1992) ) . The Goddard court also set out a three-part test
which must be met in order to grant a new trial based on
new evidence, as follows: (1) The new evidence must such
as

could

not

with

reasonable

diligence

have

been

discovered and produced at trial; (2) it must not be
merely cumulative, and (3) it must be such as to render
a different result probable on the retrial of the case.
Goddard at 545 (internal citations omitted).
The three-prong test was clearly met in the instant
case. Montoya's trial attorney submitted an affidavit to
the court setting forth his extensive efforts to locate
the witness who was a passenger in the red truck that
night. R. 284-287. The affidavit also sets forth the
circumstances

under

which

Montoya's

trial

counsel

learned, by sheer chance, and after the trial, that
Russell Thornwall had made an incriminating statement to
his brother.

R. 284-287.

Moreover, the testimony of the proposed witnesses was
not merely cumulative, and was clearly such as to "render
a

different

result

probable

on

retrial."
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The

prosecution's theory at trial was that Pete Montoya was
the shooter, although there was no direct evidence in
that

regard.

The prosecution

relied

on Mr. Montoya's

position as front seat passenger to argue that only he,
of the three individuals in the truck, could have fired
the shots.
front

The new witness would testify that he was the

seat passenger

in the

truck,

and

that

Russell

Thornwall was the shooter. The witness's statement is
especially

credible

because,

by

testifying

in

that

manner, he would place himself in the exact same position
of

Pete

Montoya

prosecution.

With

with

regards

regards

to

to

possible

Jason

criminal

Thornwall,

his

statement that Russell Thornwall told him that Pete was
in

jail

for

something

Russell

did

supports

the

confidential witness's statement in that regard.
Clearly, these witnesses, and especially the witness
who

was

a

passenger

in

the

truck

that

night,

were

critical to Mr. Montoya's defense. Trial counsel, through
affidavits, established that diligence was exercised to
locate this witness, and that the witness could not have
been discovered or produce prior to trial.

Accordingly,
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the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mr.
Montoya's motion for a new trial.
11. Montoya Received
Counsel.

Ineffective

Assistance

of

If this Court finds that the new evidence could have
been discovered and produced for trial with "reasonable
diligence," then Montoya clearly received ineffective
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to
exercise reasonable diligence.1
Generally,
assistance
two-part

of
test

to

successfully

counsel,

a

claim

defendant

established

by

the

ineffective

must

satisfy

a

Supreme

Court

in

Strickland and recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984). Under this
test,

a

defendant

must

show

performance was deficient and

(1)

that

counsel's

(2) that the deficient

Generally, an appellant cannot raise an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim for the first time on
appeal because the trial record is insufficient to
allow the claim to be determined. See State v.
Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). An
appellant, however, can raise such a claim if the trial
record is adequate to permit determination of the issue
and there is new counsel on appeal. Id.; State v.
Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App.1991).
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performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Lairby, 699 P.2d at
1203-04.
To

show

counsel's

defendant

must

omissions

that

performance

identify
"fall

counsel's
outside

was

deficient, a

specific

the

wide

acts

or

range

of

professionally competent assistance." State v. Frame, 723
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); see also Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
defendant

must

show

that

To show prejudice, a

"counsel's

errors

were

so

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct.
at 2064. Under this prong of the test, the defendant must
show that a "reasonable probability" exists that the
trial result would have been

different if counsel had

not erred. Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; Frame, 723
P.2d at 405. "A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of
the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at
2068; Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1205-06.
In the instant case, trial counsel failed to discover
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and produce the only eyewitness to the actual shooting,
besides the defendant himself. Neither Matt Seal nor Greg
Ulibarri saw the gun, and neither of them knew who fired
the shots. The State relied on circumstantial evidence,
primarily based on testimony from Matt Seals that Pete
Montoya was the front seat passenger in the truck. The
third occupant of the truck would have testified that he,
not Pete Montoya, was the front seat passenger, and that
Russell Thornwall was the shooter. Although trial counsel
submitted

an

affidavit

setting

forth

his

extensive

efforts to locate this witness, trial counsel did not
request a continuance in order to locate this critical
witness, and in fact opposed the State's request for a
continuance.
In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the
Utah Supreme Court recognized that the failure to conduct
a

reasonable

investigation

into

possible

defense

witnesses constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
Templin at 188 (internal quotations omitted). In Templin,
counsel's

inadequate

representation

was

deemed

prejudicial where the prospective witnesses would have
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provided testimony that contradicted the testimony of the
State's

main

witness

against

the

defendant.

Id.

The

Templin court noted that such testimony was particularly
important "because it affect[ed] the credibility of the
only witness who gave direct

evidence

guilt,[and

the

picture."

thus]

affect[ed]

of

entire

defendant's
evidentiary

Id.

In the instant case, the testimony of the proposed
witness would not only have affected the credibility of
Matt Seal, with regards to Pete Montoya's location within
the vehicle, but would have provided the only testimony
as to who actually fired the shots that killed Kelly Seal
and wounded Greg Ulibarri. Clearly, such testimony is
even more critical than that described in Templin, and
the failure to discover and produce this witness, or to
request

a

continuance

for

the

purpose

of

doing

so,

clearly constituted prejudicial error by Montoya's trial
counsel.
In sum, the overall effect of counsel's error clearly
and plainly prejudiced Montoya's defense, and severely
"undermines

confidence

in

the

reliability
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of

the

outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.

Ct. at

2068; Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1205-06.
3.

The Trial Court Erred When it Denied Appellant's
Motion for Directed Verdict.

Motions for directed verdicts in criminal proceedings
are governed by U.C.A., 1953, § 77-17-3 and Rule 17 (o) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (U.C.A., 1953, § 7735-17 (o)) .

Section

77-17-3

requires

the

immediate

discharge of a defendant M[w]hen it appears to the court
that there is not sufficient evidence to put a defendant
to

his

defense."

Rule

17 (o) of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Criminal Procedure authorizes the dismissal of an entire
information or indictment, or any count thereof, either
at the end of State's evidence or at the close of all the
evidence
legally

" upon the ground
sufficient

to

that

establish

the evidence

is not

the

charged

offense

therein or any lesser included offense."
The standard for determining whether an order denying
a motion for directed verdict is erroneous is the same as
that applied by an appellate court in determining whether
a

jury verdict

should be

set

aside

for

insufficient
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evidence. Under that standard, a trial court may arrest
a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so
inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
as to that element. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444
(Utah 1983); State v. McCardell. 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah
1982); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976).
A. Count I
Count I charged Pete Montoya with Criminal Homicide,
Murder, under Section 76-5-203 of the Utah Code, alleging
that Mr. Montoya:
Intentionally or knowingly caused the death of
Kelly N. Seal and/or intending to cause serious
bodily injury to another, committed an act
dangerous to human life that caused the death of
Kelly N. Seal, and/or acting under circumstances
evidencing depraved indifference to human life,
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of
death to another, and thereby caused the death
of Kelly N. Seal, and [that a dangerous weapon
as used, giving rise to enhanced penalties.]
In reviewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, and all of the inferences that
can reasonably be drawn from such evidence, it is clear
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that the evidence that Pete Montoya was the shooter is so
lacking that "reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt."
It was undisputed at trial that Russell Thornwall
instigated
case,

a an altercation with the victims

yelling

at

them,

throwing

up

his

in this

hands,

and

maneuvering his truck in an aggressive manner while Pete
Montoya was inside the gas station. It is undisputed that
Russell Thornwall was the driver of the truck, and that
Russell followed the boys as they began to leave the gas
station and veered toward them, nearly colliding with
them.

Shots were fired from Thornwall's truck, which

killed Kelly Seal and injured Greg Ulibarri, but none of
the State's witnesses saw the gun or knew who had fired
the

gun.

The

following

is

a

review

of

the

evidence

linking Pete Montoya to the shooting:
1.

Presence

The evidence showed that Pete Montoya was a passenger
in the red truck driven by Russell Thornwall at the time
of the shooting.
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2.

Position in the truck

Although the evidence was contradictory regarding
Pete Montoya's position in the truck, Matt Seal testified
at trial that he saw Pete Montoya walk out of the store
and get into the passenger side of the truck.
3.

Yelling

Matt Seal testified that, at the moment when Russell
Thornwall drove his truck aggressively toward the boys'
Honda and nearly collided with them, he looked up and saw
Pete Montoya leaning forward and yelling something, along
with Russell Thornwall. He testified that he heard two or
three voices yelling "pussies" and "VLT." Greg Ulibarri
also testified that he heard two or three voices yelling
something from the truck, both at the payphones and at
the time of the near collision.
4.

Physical Evidence

The prosecution's case relied heavily on arguments
that the path of the bullets, which followed a slight
right to left path, could not have been fired from the
driver's side of the vehicle. Yet, the evidence regarding
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the location of the truck when the bullets were fired was
simply inconclusive. Although Greg Ulibarri testified
that the truck was "dead center" and about 15 feet behind
them when he glanced up, this was prior to the bullets
being fired. Greg testified that as Kelly began to turn
left, out of the exit, he heard two loud bangs. Matt
testified that he saw the truck's headlights directly
behind their car as they exited the gas station, and that
the truck was "behind [them], off to the right a little
bit," when the shots were fired. Both Matt and Greg
testified that after the shots were fired they saw or
heard the truck speeding off to the right of them.
Clearly,

the

testimony

of

Greg

and

Matt

merely

establishes that the truck was behind them prior to the
shots being fired, and the truck raced off the right
after

the

shots were

fired. The evidence

does show

however that the boys' car was in motion when the shots
were fired, and that the truck may have been in motion
when the shots were fired, and was definitely in motion
immediately after the shots were fired. The testimony of
Greg and Matt simply does not pinpoint the position of
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the truck in relation to the car at the moment of the
shooting, and thus simply does not support the State's
argument that the shots had to have been fired by the
passenger in order to create the slight right-to-left
angle of the bullet's path.

If the boys' car was turning

left and the truck was veering right at the precise
moment of the shooting, the right-to-left path of the
bullets could have easily been attributed to the driver
of the truck, or even to the middle passenger. Moreover,
the location of the bullet casings, as shown in State's
Exhibits 34 and 43, simply does not establish that the
shots must have been fired by the front seat passenger,
rather than the driver or the middle passenger.
The State also argued that Russell Thornwall could
not have fired the shots while he was driving the vehicle
and changing gears. But according to the testimony of
Matt Seals and Greg Ulibarri, Thornwall began racing away
and squealing his tires after the shots were fired and
not before. It is common knowledge that there are driveby shootings, and that drivers of vehicles are able to
fire shots as they maneuver a vehicle. In this case,
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Thornwall was stopped behind the boys' vehicle, and was
moving slowly, if at all, when the shots were fired.
Moreover the State's theory that Pete Montoya was the
shooter clearly required him to lean partially out of the
window to fire shots across the hood of the truck, and
yet, Matt

Sutoyo testified

that he looked up at

the

moment he heard the gunshots and did not see anyone or
anything hanging or leaning out of the passenger side
window.
In sum, the evidence simply showed that shots were
fired from Thornwall's truck, and that Pete Montoya was
present

in the truck and may have joined

altercation
victims.

in

which

Thornwall

The evidence

was

engaged

simply does not

the verbal
with

implicate

the
Pete

Montoya as the shooter over the other two occupants of
the

truck.

This

is

a

case

where

the

evidence

"is

sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted." State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah
App. 1990).
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B.

Counts II and III

Counts II and III charged Pete Montoya with Attempted
Criminal Homicide, under Section 76-5-203 of the Utah
Code,

alleging

that

Mr,

Montoya

"intentionally

and

knowingly attempted to cause the death of Matt Seal" in
Count II, and "intentionally and knowingly attempted to
cause the death of Greg Ulibarri" in Count III.
As argued above, there was insufficient evidence to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pete Montoya was the
shooter. But even assuming, for argument's sake that
there was sufficient evidence to show that Mr. Montoya
was the shooter, there was simply no evidence that Pete
Montoya intended to kill Matt Seal or Greg Ulibarri.
The evidence, as outlined above, shows that someone
in the red truck shot gunfire at the back of the Honda.
Although

intent

can

usually

be

inferred

from

circumstantial evidence, see State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d
378, 381 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (aiming gun at victim for
five to seven seconds was sufficient evidence of intent
to kill) , in this case there was simply no evidence
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whatsoever that Pete Montoya intended to kill Matt Seal
or Greg Ulibarri. As stated above, the evidence simply
showed that Pete Montoya joined in a verbal altercation
that was commenced by Russell Thornwall, and that someone
fired

gunshot

at

the

rear

of

the

victim's

vehicle.

Moreover, the evidence simply does not show that three
shots

were

fired

at

the

boys'

car.

John

Campbell

testified that he recovered two bullet casings from the
scene of the shooting. He testified that he could not
determine the number of shots fired, but that at least
two, and perhaps four, shots were fired. Greg Ulibarri
testified

that

he

heard

two

loud

bangs.

Matt

Seal

testified that he heard two or three shots. Matt Sotuyo
testified that he heard two gunshots. Clearly, at the
very least, the State would have to have shown that three
shots were fired in order to convict Pete Montoya of
attempted

homicide

of

Greg

Ulibarri

and

Matt

Seal.

Moreover, there was no evidence that the gun was aimed at
anything other than the vehicle in general.
Clearly, the evidence of Pete Montoya's intent to
kill

Matt

Seal

and

Greg

Ulibarri

"is
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sufficiently

inconclusive

or inherently

improbable

that

reasonable

minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."
State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1990).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Montoya respectfully asserts
that

he

was

wrongfully

convicted

of

Homicide

and

Attempted Homicide, and requests that his conviction be
vacated.

an"
DATED this

Ju

day of September, 2002.

SHARON PRESTON
Attorney for Pete Montoya
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I certify that on the

day of September, 2002,

I deposited two copies of the foregoing brief in the U.S.
mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:

J. Frederick Voros Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 14084
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

SHARON FRESTON
Attorney for Pete Montoya
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76-5-203. Murder.
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means:
(a) violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab Act;
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18 years of age;
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301;
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1;
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302;
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1;
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3;
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1;
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404;
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 76-5-404.1;
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402;
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2;
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403;
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405;
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102;
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103;
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202;
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203;
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301;
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309.
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the
death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the actor engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another;
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted
commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense; and
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of the commission, attempted commission, or
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense;
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission or attempted commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace
officer;
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under Section 76-5-205.5.
(3) Murder is afirstdegree felony.
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the defendant caused the death of another or
attempted to cause the death of another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse; or
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct
was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances.
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include:
(i) a condition resultingfrommental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct.
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection
4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows:
(i) murder to manslaughter; and
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.
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